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1. Introduction 
This paper is about U.S. overseas military presence. lt lays out some basic data to show the 
extensiveness of the American military base neれへ10rkaround the globe. Today， the United States is 
undisputedly the most powerful couηtry in the world. America's status as a unipolar power is by 
no means guaranteed forever， but the level of primacy will not soon fade away， either. To be sure， 
the U.S. has the largest economy in the world. Its defense budget is larger than that of the rest 
of the countries in the world combined， and the nation is equipped with world's most advanced 
weapons system. U.S. power is primarily discussed in terms of material capabilities (Brooks and 
Wohlforth 2008; Wohlforth 1999). However， insuch discussions， the bases and soldiers stationed 
overseas that allow the U.S. military to project force well beyond its borders are overlooked. 
Without such assets， the United States would be unable to wield its miJitary and political power 
Comprehensive surveys of America's undisputed power pro炉ctioncapability are rare. Thus， 
the aim of this paper is to provide a general overview of the extensiveness of the U.S. military 
presence around the globe by looking at various data from di町、erentangles. More specificalIy， this 
paper is built around three questions: (1) How many military personnel are stationed abroad? 
(2) What is the trend regarding the number of Status of Force Agreements (SOFAs) signed by the 
United States and host nations? and (3) What is the structure of U.S. regional command? Answers 
to these questions should offeI崎 acomplete picture of U.S. global presence， because they would 
not only provide the number of soldiers stationed overseas， which is a popular measure， but also 
explanations for the numbers， as well as the trend regarding SOFAs， especially after the Cold War. 
The paper also looks at the global command structure， which virtual1y covers the entire globe. 
Taken together， these constitute a comprehensive indicator of the degree of U.S. dominance 
around the world. 
In the study of international relations， balance of power theory is considered one of the most 
inf1uential theories. In essence， itsays that a state creates a balance against powerful states either 
by forming alliances with other countries or by building up its own defenses (Waltz 1979). This 
theory relates to ways in which states align to counter exter 
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to say about o.S. military presence around the globe. Given the reduction of the threat from the 
former Soviet states， itwould be reasonable to assume that the United States would have engaged 
in substantial military downsizing both at home and abroad after the Cold War. This should not 
conf1ict with the basic logic of the theory. The analysis below suggests that the overall number 
of o.S. military personnel at home and abroad has indeed gone down， although it is worth noting 
that the number of overseas personnel has remained stable at around 250，000 between the 
Persian Gulf War and the Afghan War and Iraq War years. 
1n contrast， the number of countries in which U.S. forces have been stationed has increased 
after the end of the Cold War働Moreover， the o.S. global command structure is stil alive and well， 
and in fact. several new command structures have recently been formed. One was the North 
America Command. created in the aftermath of 9/1 1 to strengthen defense of the American 
homeland. and another was the Africa Command. created solely to deal with the African region. 
for which different commands have shared responsibilities in the past. 
These trends show that the United States is continuing to sustain its predominant mi1itary 
presence around the globe. In other words， the United States seems to be trying to maintain its 
unipolar status as the most powerful nation in the world. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First， 1 will provide a basic analysis of 
o.S. global presence by examining statistical data of o.S. military personnel stationed around the 
world. A brief discussion of international events will be included to give more meaning to the 
data. Second， 1 willlook at the number of SOFAs to examine the trend， especially after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. Third. 1 will examine the history and structure of U.S. regional mi1itary 
commands. ln the conclusion， 1 will brief1y discuss some implications for international relations 
theory and future research. 
1. U.s Global Presence 
The U.S. global military presence is， in a word. overwhelming. No other mi1i切りIcan match the 
extent to which the United States can reach di汀erentparts of the globe. Although the number 
of o.S. forces has declined since the height of the Cold War. the United States stil maintains the 
largest number of forces deployed overseas. 
As of March 31. 2009. the total number of U.S. troops was 1.412.529. About 20 percent of a1 
o.S. forces， or 293.701 soldiers， were deployed in foreign countries. This figure does not include 
the numbers of soldiers五ghtingin countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. which werモ 174.200and 
41，300， respectively. Adding these numbers to the peacetime foreign military presence figure 
and the worldwide tota1. about 31 percent， or 509，201 so叶ld也ie臼r喝's.would be considered stationed 
outside the con1抗凶t柱:inenta討1United States and its territories (o.S. Department of Defense 2009). Just 
to consider the peacetime presence figure (293.701) alone in perspective， itis larger than that of 
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FIGURE 1. U.S. Soldiers Stationed Overseas， 1950-2009 
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Source: U.S. Department of Defense， "Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by 
Country (309A)，" 1950-2009. http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.millpersonnel/MILITAIミY/miltop.htm (Accessed 
October 2. 2009). 
Note: Data for 1951-1952 is not available 
Japan's Self Defense Forces， which is around 250，000 (Japan Ministry of Defense 2009). 
Before the 1940s， the number of U.S. soldiers stationed overseas was quite limited， as the 
United States did not have an extensive base network around the globe. 1n fact， the United States 
did not even have a strong military in the 1890s， and the size of its military did not match the size 
of its economy. The number of Army soldiers was only about 25，000， and the Navy was stil very 
small. Fifty years before WWlI (around 1890)， the U.S. Army was ranked 14th (after Bulgaria). 
Moreover， U.S. Navy was smal1er than that of Italy， although America's industrial strength was 
13 times greater (Kissinger 1994:37). The United States was busy expanding its territory in the 
North American continent through purchasing land and fighting wars in the narrie of Manifest 
9S 
Destiny. 
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The U.S. victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898 marlくedthe beginning of major U.S. 
overseas expansion.1 The United States gained a naval base in Guantanamo， Cuba， where the 
oldest U.S. base overseas is located. Moreover， the United States occupied the Philippines， Puerto 
l~ico ， and Guam， which were under Spain's contro1. The Island of Hawaii was also annexed as 
a territory of the United States. Despite such overseas expansions， no signi1'icant U.S. military 
network was created untH World War Ientered ful swing.2 
The number of U.S. bases dramatically increased during World War II， because more bases 
were needed near the Axis countries as the United States SC01司edvictories and advanced well into 
the heart of the enemy territories. The fact t出ha抗tmore bases were built du1'ing wa1'time comes 
as no s乱釦u山11'句下、p1'is兜esince bases constitute a c1'ucial c∞omponent when conducting military operations 
abroad; wa剖r句廿、
overseas sites before WWI日， but by the time the war was over， there were well over 2，000 base 
sites spread throughout the globe. And no othe1' country has ever built so many bases in such a 
short period as the United States (Blaker 1990:21). 
A1'ter WWII， many American soldiers returned home， and the number of U.S. soldiers 
stationed overseas dropped significantly. However， some remained abroad to occupy defeated 
powers such as Germany and Japan. Bases used during the occupation in Japan and Germany， as 
well as others， were later used to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War 
The number of U.S. soldiers overseas was to rise again during the Kor、eanWar. Bases in 
Okinawa played a pivotal role in providing logistical support. The Korean War shocked the U.S. 
administration as well as America's alies in Europe. The Soviet Union's support of the North 
Korea was suspected， and the aggressive Soviet intentions worried U.S. alies. This fear， in 
particular， led to the consolidation 01' Western alies. 
Another cause 1'or the increase of U.S. soldiers overseas came with the war in Vietnam.τhe 
United States' involvement in the Vietnam War was at its peak when Richard Nixon toolくoffice
in 1969 (Frontline 2004a). In East Asia and the Pacific region， there were more than 750，000 
soldiers， and over 500，000 of them were stationed in South Vietnam. For the next six years， the U.S. 
troop presence continued to decline in the region. The troop level in this region was at aroun 
Howevel¥there were some cases in which small islands were incorporated to the United States before the 
Spanish-American War. The 1867 Midway annexation was a case in point. See Zakaria (1998) 
2 The reason why the United States did not remain at its overseas bases after World War 1 seems to be a puzle. U.S 
strategic thinking-isolationism-may have been the cause. See Legro (2005). 
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loss of active-duty military personnel-over 1 million， or about a thirせofal service members. 
Moreover， the United States was less willing to deploy a large presence， especially after the 
Vietnam expeI旬、ience.However， in the Middle East， the number of U.S. soldiers increased by about 
50 percent between 1969 and 1974， from 938 to 1.460 troops. 
The United States officially withdrew fr刀mVietnam when Saigon fel on April 30， 1975 
(Frontline 2004b). During the Ford administration， the U.S. military did not engage in military 
interventions. Moreover¥while the United States had an extensive military presence in Thailand 
since the 1950s， the U.S. forces withdrew most of its 15，000 troops fr刀mthat nation in 1976. 
In the late 1970s， the Middle East was the main focal point of America's foreign policy 
(Frontline 2004c). Many important events took place in this region during the Carter 
administration. 1n fact， in 1979， President Carter himself negotiated a peace treaty between the 
two rivals， Israel and Egypt. which helped them to resolve their border disputes. In the same 
year， the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The U.S. relationship with Iran deteriorated rapidly 
during the Iranian Revolution， and the U.S. Embassy was seized by Iranian students， who took 
hostages for 444 days. Because of the dl、amaticchange in relations between the two countries， 
the United States withdrew its troops from Iran， where about 600 to 1，000 U.S. tr、oopshad been 
present every year. To make up for the withdrawal. the United States increased the number of 
troops afloat from 1，000 a few years before to more than 18.000. ln Asia. China and the United 
States normalized relations on January 1， 1979. This became possible due 1:0 the secretive and 
bold diplomacy of Henry Kissinger， the National Security Advisor under Nixon. Ten troops were 
stationed there for the firs1: time since 1947. Part of the deal between China and the United States 
involved the permanent withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan. As a result， about 700 U.S. troops 
withdrew from Taiwan. 
During the Reagan administration， the United States recorded the largest military build.ぺJpin 
peace time (Fr‘ontline 2004d). The number‘of troops had continued to rise until 1987. The United 
States had been refraining from military intervention after内 theVietnam War， but for the first 
time since the fal of Saigon， t 
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backed by the U.S. Marcos was voted out of office， and by the time he was sent into exile in 1986， 
more than 16，000 U.S‘troops were stationed in the Philippines. In North Africa， in 1986， the 
United States conducted air strikes against Ubya， a country suspected of sponsoring terrorism. 
In response， in Africa， the Middle East， and South Asia， troop levels peaked at 20，000 in 1987. 
During the second Reagan administration， U.S. troops deployed WOI泊widehad continued to grow 
and in 1987， the number reached 2，174，217， a post-Vietnam high. 
Not long after George Bush took office， 20，000 U.S. troops were sent to Panama to capture 
President Manuel Noriega， who was wanted in connection with narcotics charges (Front1ine 
2004f). After that， the Bush administration faced dramatic changes in the international 
environment with the fal of the Berlin Wal1 in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 
These events contributed to the significant decline of the number of U.S. forces abroad. In Europe， 
at the end of Reagan's second term， the number was about 350，000， but by the end of the Bush 
administration， ithad declined to 200，000-a 40 percent decrease. East Asia and the Pacific 
region also showed similar trends. The number fel by 30 percent from about 135，000 (1988) to 
95，000 (1992). However， this was partially due to the temporary concentration of forces in the 
Middle East to fight the 1991 Gulf War. Of the approximately 70，000じ.S.troops in the Middle 
East， about 30，000 were in Saudi Arabia and 40，000 were afloat. By the autumn of 1992， the 
troop levels in the Middle East returned to just above their 1989 numbers. President Bush， just 
before leaving office， sent 25，000 U.S. soldiers to Somalia for famine relief. 
In the next administration， President William J. Clinton continued to deal with the problem 
in Somalia (Frontline 2004g). He reduced the troop level to 5，000， and ordered a complete 
withdrawal after 18 U.S. Rangers were killed in that nation. However， C1inton decided to send 
25，000 U.S. troops to yet another country， Haiti， where social order had been deteriorating since 
1991， when President Aristide had been removed from office in a coup. The U.S.， however， sent 
only a handful troops to Rwanda in 1994， where more than 800，000 were ki1led in 100 days.3 
From September 1995 to September 1996， approximately 19，000 U.S. forces were sent to the 
three former Yugoslavian countries and participate 
3 For a detailed account of non-U.S. involvement， see Power (2002) 
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fel from 20，000 (1992) to 1 1，000 (2000). During the same period. in Panama. the number was 
reduced from 10，000 to a mere 20. ln a NATO-led war in Kosovo. the United States participated in 
operations to put a halt on the ethnic c1eansing of Kosovar Albanians by Serb nationalists. When 
the conflict was at its peak in 1999， about 13.500 U.S. forces vl'ere deployed in Bosnia. Croatia， 
Macedonia， and Serbia. 
Additional troops were deployed in the Middle East， where Iraq had failed to cooperate 
with the U.N. team inspecting Iraq's weapons. The number had gone up from 12，400 in 1997 to 
29，800 in 1999 throughout North Africa. the Middle East， and South Asia (the region in which 
Iraq is inc1uded). By deploying ail、craftcarriers to the region， the United States threatened to 
attack Iraq. Within the region. about 5，500 U.S. troops welモinSaudi Arabia， 4.000 in Kuwait， and 
16，100 afloat. Althoughηo ground troops were deployed. the United States launched a cruise 
missile attack on Afghanistan as well as Sudan in response to the bombing of U.S. embassies 
carried out by Osama bin Laden. 
A notable change occurred after September 11. 2001. when a terrorist group attacked 
the World Trade Center in New York and the Department of Defense in Washington. D.C. ln 
response to these attacks， the United States started a bombing campaign on October 7. 2001， in 
Afghanistan to bring down the Taliban regime that harbored the al Qaida terr01恰tgroup (Frontline 
2004i). The United States quickly turned its eyes toward Iraq， searching [or links with al Qaida. 
Although there was no c1ear evidence of such links. the U.S. invaded 1I、aqon March 19. 2003， 
with approximately 200，000 soldiers. and achieved a quick military victory in three weeks. The U.S. 
maintained over 200.000 troops in Iraq to continue the occupation. Due to the need to 1叫nforce
the U.S. presence in the Middle East， the number of U.S. soldiers in the Western Hemisphe問
had decreased from about 14，000 troops in 2001 to only 2.000 in 2004. In the second Bush 
administration， the president ordered a so-called surge to increase the number of troops in 
lraq. During the Obama administration， more troops were redirected to Afghanistan as the new 
administration shifted the focus of war from lraq to Afghanistan. 
ln sum， the number of U.S. forces abroad has fluctuated， and it has been most significantly 
affected by wars. The Korean and Vietnam Wars wer 
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11. Status of Forces Agreements 
A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is an agreement concluded between a sending nation and 
a host country， It stipulates various rights and responsibilities between， for example， the United 
States (the sending nation) and Japan (the host government)， SOFAs are negotiated individually 
with each host country. In principle， there are no substantial differences among them， Specific 
situations in host countries. however. make for some di百"erencesin certain issue areas. 
TABLE 1 List of Countries Signing SOFAs by Year (1945-1999) 
1945 Turkeyネ 1974 
1946 1975 
1947 1976 
1948 1977 Antigua and Barbuda 
1949 1978 
1950 1979 Panama， St Lucia料¥Turksand Caicos 
1951 Iceland. Spain Island 
1952 United Kingdom料* 1980 Oman. Somalia 
1953 Belgium. Canada， Denmark. 1981 Egypt. Sudan 
Franceネ.Italy. Japan， Luxembourg， 1982 Honduras， Morocco 
Netherlands， Norway， Portugal. Saudi 1983 Bahamas 
Arabia 1984 
1954 1985 
1955 1986 Federated States of Micronesia 
1956 Marshall Islands 
1957 Ascension Island 1987 St. Kitts & Nevis 
1958 1988 Dominican Republic 
1959 New Zealand 1989 
1960 1990 Malaysia， Papua New Guinea， 
1961 Singapore， Western Samoa 
1962 1991 Bermuda. Kuwait， Solomon Islands 
1963 Jamaica料，Trinidad and Tobago料 1992 Qatar， Tonga 
1964 Australia. Germany， Greece 1993 Grenada 
1965 1994 Brunei. Ethiopia， Israel. Palau. United 
1966 Arab Emirates 
1967 Diego Garcia， Korea 1995 Bosnia“Herzegovina (for IFOR/SFOR). 
1968 Croatia (for IFOR/SFOR)， Haiti. Sri 
1969 Lanka 
1970 1996 Albania， Bulgaria， Cambodia， 
1971 Bahrain Czech Republic， Estonia， FYROM 
1972 (Macedonia)， Hungary， Jordan， Latvia. 
1973 Lithuania. Mongolia， Romania， 
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Slovak Republic， Slovenia， Sweden， 
Uzbekistan (provisionally) 
1997 Former Republic of Yugoslavia， 
Finland， Georgia， Kazakhstan， Mali. 
Moldova， Poland， Uganda， Ukraine 
(provisionally) 
1998 Australia， Bangladesh， Benin， Cote d' 
Ivoire， Ghana， Philippines 
1999 South Africa 
Note 
*Both France and Turkey have resisted the 
application of the NATO SOFA to 
activities in their territory that are 
not in support of NATO purposes. 
本語'SOFAprovisions of 1941 United States-
United Kingdom Lend Lease 
Agreement apply， and wer‘e continued 
in application by former United 
Kingdom tel吋
their independence 
料水The1952 Visiting Force Act is a unilateral 
British statute enacted to supp!ement 
the NATO SOFA of 1951 within the 
United Kingdom. Britain e!ected this 
approach， rather than concluding 
a supplementary agreement with 
the United States as a sendilig state. 
Unfortunate!y， the Visiting Forces Act 
does not fuly agree with the NATO 
SOFA， Pコar一唱1廿‘'
and this has led to disput♂es f白1司omtime 
to time. 
Soμrce: This table was created based on the information retrieved fl‘om Ofl'Ice of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)). 1999.“Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs)，" http://policy.defense.gov/ 
sections/policy _offices/isa/inra/da/lisLoLsofas.html (accessed January 2， 2010). 
Note: Information for the years after 1999 has not been updated 
SOFAs normally deal with matters essential for everyday life， "such as entry and exit of 
forces， entry and exit of personal belongings (i.e. automobiles)， labor， cIaims and contractors， and 
susceptibility to income and sales taxes" as well as issues surrounding facilities related to postal 
offices， recreation， and banking， when the U.S， presence will be long-term. lssues also incIude 
“the wearing of the uniform， the carrying of arms， and resolving damage cIaims (Globa1Security. 
org n.dνA more signi五cantissue involving SOFAs re1ates to civil and criminal jurisdiction. One 
of the centr討 issuesis protection against unfair tria1 and imprisonment of U.S. soldiers stationed 
abroad. For host countries， this is an area of contention. Some host countries find it unfair when 
they 1earn that othe1‘host countries have more legal power in handling U.S. personnel invo1ved in 
cnmes. 
SOFAs alone do not permit the stationing of U.S. forces on the soil of other countries. 
Normally， SOFAs constitutes a centra1 part of the overall military bases agreement that permits U.s 
forces to stay in the host country. 
Generally， SOFAs are bilateral， with the only exception being the case of the North At1antic 
Treaty Organization (NATO)， which concIuded a mu1tilateral SOFA among its members. 
SOFAs have exhibited interesting developments since the end of the Cold War. The number of 
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SOFAs increased dramatically while the threat of the Soviet Union declined. Of 92 SOFAs， 40 were 
signed during the Cold War， while 52 were signed thereafter. Considering the fact that 40 SOFAs 
were signed within 54 years (1945-89)， 52 within ten years (1989-1999) is an extremely a high 
number. This means， on average， about 0.7 agreements were signed every year during the Cold 
War， while 5.2 were signed per year in the post】ColdWar era-more than a 7 -fold increase. 
As can be recognized from Table 1， more countries signed SOFA agreements in 1953 than 
in any previous year. Most of them were NATO members including Belgium， Canada， Denmark， 
France， Italy， Luxembourg， the Nether叫lands，Norway， and Portugal. ln addition to these countrles， 
Japan and Saudi Arabia signed SOFAs in 1953. The largest such figu1'e in the post-Cold War 
era was for 1996， when 16 countries signed SOFAs. This was a result of preparation for NATO 
expansion eastward， as candidate countries participated in the Pa1'tnership fo1' Peace (Pfp) 
program. The Czech Repub1ic， Hungary， and Poland were to formally join NATO two yea1's later. 
Why do we find an increase in the number of SOFAs after何 theCold War? First， the end of the 
Cold War brought anxieties to some of the Asian countries. Although the threat is stil potential， 
some Asian countries watch China carefully. They worry that the United States might retreat 
from the region and create a power vacuum. Malaysia， Papua New Guinea， Singapore， B1'unei. 
Australia， and the Philippines signed SOFAs with the United States after the Cold War， but the 
most interesting case is that of the Philippines. The Philippines ended its 0汀erto allow U.S. forces 
to stay in 1991. However， due to aggressive behavior of China over the disputed Spratly Islands. a 
resource-rich area where several countries have made claims， the Philippines began to regret the 
decision they had made about the U.S. withdrawal. ln 1998， the Philippines and the United States 
singed an agreement regarding treatment of United Sates armed forces visiting the Philippines. 
The Visiting Forces Agreement. or VFA， is a miniature version of a SOFA. Consequently， occasional 
visits of U.S. forces made the Philippines feel secure. The Filipino nationalism that drove American 
forces off their soil was unable to ignore the international environment. 
Examining the situation of Europe， itcan be noted that former Sovi 
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and allows it to achieve predominance in terms of global military presence. 
ln addition to SOFAs and the cooperation of host countries， the United States has a command 
structure that helps maintain its global militarγpresence. The next section looks at such 
command structure， which virtually spans the entire globe. 
IV. U.5. Regional ζommands 
The military's primary mission is to defend its own homeland. The areas of responsibility for 
the U.S. military， however， are not limited to its own territory. Of course， the United States is not 
responsible for solving every military conflict in the world， but it has a global command structure 
that comes close to encompassing the globe. No other country has such an extensive command 
structure. 
Some have been merged over time and some have been newly created， but as of January 
2010， there were six regional commands: the Northern Command， the Pacific Command， the 
European Command， the Southern Command， the Central Command， and the African Command. 
The Pacific Command is the oldest. and the African Command is the most recent addition. 
Along with these regional unified combatant commands， there are four functional commands: 
the、JointForces Command， the Special Oper唱ationsCommand， the Strategic Command， and the 
Transportation Command. These commands deal with speci白cfunctional aspects of the military. 
Although those commands are important， the focus here is on regional commands， as they pertain 
to the geographical areas that the United States covers worldwide. For each command structure， 1 
will examine a brief history， areas of responsibility， and some characteristics. 
1. The United States Pacific Command 
The United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) is the oldest unified command. It was estabHshed 
on ]anuary 1， 1947. Currently， "it encompasses about half the earth's surface， stretching from the 
west coast of the U.S. to the western border of India， and from Antarctica to the North Pole (United 
States Pacific Command n.d.)，" USPACOM covers the largest area of a1 of the regional combatant 
commands. 
lts area of responsibility (AOR) includes 36 countries: China， Japan， Mongolia， North Korea， 
South Korea， Bangladesh， Bhutan， India， Maldives， Nepal， Sri Lanka， Brunei， Burma， Cambodia， 
Indonesia， Laos， Malaysia， the Philippines， Singapore. Thailand. Timor-Leste， Vietnam， Australia. 
Fiji， 1くiribati， the Marshall Islands. Micronesia. Nauru， New Zealand， Palau， Papua New Guinea， 
Samoa， the Solomon Islands. Tonga， Tuvalu， and Vanuatu (United States Paci五cCommand 2009). 
As one can easi1y imagine， the AOR of USPACOM is quite diverse in many respects. It constitutes 
more than half of the world population， and three thousand different languages are spoken in 
this area. Some major military powers as well as major economies are within this AOR. Important 
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American alies (Japan， South Korea， and Australia) ar司eincluded within USPACOM's AOR. At the 
same time， itincludes North Korea (an unfriendly ηation)， China (a potential riva1 and the world's 
most populous country)， Indonesia (the largest Mus1im nation)， and India (the 1argest democracy) 
(United States Pacific Command n.d.). 
Because of the vast area it covers， approximately one品fthof the overall U.S. military strength 
serve in this area. The number inc!udes not only those that are stationed in particular countries， 
but a1so those on board vessels (or “atloat"). As such， the Navy and the Marines account for the 
largest percentage of the military presence in USPACOM (United States Pacific Command n.d.). 
One of the basic assumptions held by USPACOM regarding its presence in the region is 
that it wil retain“at least the current level of force presence and posture (United States Pacific 
Command 2009:6)." This suggests that it does not intend to leave the region any time soon， and 
considers maintaining such force presence and posture to be essentia1 in creating stability. Also， 
in order to achieve its strategic objectives (e.g.， protecting the homeland through maintaining a 
strong military capabilities and strengthening security arrangements with alies and partners， 
among others)， USPACOM values“[b]i-lateral and multilateral alliance agreements， inc1uding 
mutual defense treaties governing access to and interoperabi1ty with AOR nations (United 
States Paci五cCommand 2009:9)プAllianceagreements that allow U.S. access are crucial for the 
achievement of U.S. national interests in the Asia時Pacificregion. 
2. The United States Africa仁ommand
The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) is the newest of al the regional commands. 
President George W. Bush and Robert Gates， Secretary of Defense， announced the creation of 
AFRICOM in February 2007， and it was formally established in October 2007. AFRICOM's activities 
in its日rstyear， however， were managed by the U.S島EuropeanCommand， which previously shared 
some responsibilities for Africa with other regional commands (United States Africa Command 
n.d.a). On October 1， 2008， AFRICOM gained independent status， using existing faci1ities in 
Germany's Kelley Bar司racks，Stuttgart. AFRICOM is now searching for candidate locations in Africa 
to set up its head司uarters(United States Africa Command n.d.b). 
AFRICOM's area of responsibility includes a1 countries in the African continent except Egypt: 
Mauritania， Western Sahara， Morocco， Algeria， Tunisia， Libya， Senegal， the Gambia， Guinea Bissau， 
Guinea， Republic of the Cape Verdi， Ma1i， Niger， Nigeria， Benin， Togo， Ghana， Burkina Faso， Cote D' 
Ivoire， Liberia， Liberia， Sierra Leone， Chad， the Central African Republic， the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (Zaire)， Angola， the Republic of Congo， Gabon， Equatorial Guinea， Cameroon， Sudan， 
Eritrea， Djjbouti， Somalia， Kenya， Tanzania， Madagascar， MalawI， Burundi， Rwanda， Uganda， 
Zambia， Mozambique， Swaziland， Lesotho， South Africa， Namibia， Botswana， and Zimbabwe. 
The need to create a separate command focused on Africa had been discussed in the 
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Oepartment of Oefense (000) since the end of the Cold War. The peace and stability of Africa 
had been considered important by the United States， but there had never been a single regional 
command that took sole responsibility for this region. 1n fact. America's relations with African 
countries were maintained by “three different U.S. military head中larters(United States Africa 
Command n.d.a)." With the creation of AFRICOM， the 000 can now devise a more comprehensive 
strategy and focus its resources on a single headquarter site. As for African countries， AFRICOM 
acts as an “integrated 000 coordination point that helps achieve security and related needs (United 
States Africa Command n.d.a)." 
There have been some discussions about the reasons why the United States decided to set up 
a command in Africa. One reason may be China's increased activities in Africa. Some argue that 
China's growing demand for energy is the driving force behind such activism. The United States， 
too， isinterested in oi1 produced in Africa， and thus the need to become involved in the region 
has inevitably increased. Theresa Whelan， Oeputy Assistant Secretary of Oefense for African 
Affairs， stated in a February 2007 brie合ng，"This is not about a scramble for the continent (Hanson 
2007)." However， itis estimated that by the next decade，“the continent will account for、20to 25 
percent of U.S. energy imports (Northam 2007)." 
Oeterring terrorist activities is perhaps the most important reason behind the move. As 
the posture statement indicates， the strategic objective is to “[djefeat the AI-Qaeda terrorist 
organization and its associated networks (United States Africa Command 2009: 11)." Whatever 
the specific reason may be， with a formalized new command focusing on Africa， the United 
States intends to expand even further the area to be covered by its military and to strengthen its 
presence. 
3. The United 5tatesζentral仁ommand
Established on ]anuary 1， 1983， the United States Central Command (USCENTROM) covers the 
areas located between the European Command and the Pacific Command. The Soviet Union's 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis in 1ran in 1980 called for 
furthe1' U.S. inte1'est in the 1'egion. ln March 1980， P1'esident ]immy Ca1'te1' c1'eated the Rapid 
Oeployment ]oint Task Force (RD]TF) in response to these c1'ises， and Ronald Reagan t1'ansformed 
訳D]TFinto the mo1'e pe1'manent USCENTCOM in 1983. 
CENTCOM's area of responsibility (AOR) inc1udes: Afghanistan， Bah1'ain， Egypt， I1'an， I1'aq， 
]ordan， Kazakhstan， Kuwait， KY1'gyzstan， Lebanon， Oman， Pakistan， Qatar， Saudi Arabia， Syria， 
Tajikistan， Turkmenistan， the United Arab Emirates， Uzbekistan， and Yemen (United States Central 
Command n.d.a). Geographically speaking， Egypt may be within the area of responsibility of the 
Africa Command， but because of Egypt's relationship with other countries in CENTCOM's AOR， 
Egypt has been inc1uded. 
105 
Anθa Studies Tsukuba 31・93-112，2010
106 
USCENTCOM's importance has risen since the end of the Cold War. After Iraq invaded Kuwait 
in August 1990， the United States and coalition forces launched Operation Dessert Storm on 
January 17， 1991. 1t began with an overwhelming air interdiction campaign， which set the stage 
for a ground assault. The U.S. and coalition forces liberated Kuwait on February 27 -just one 
hundred hours after the ground campaign had started. The United States was able to respond 
quickly because USCENTCOM Commander-in-Chief General H. Norman Schwarzkopf had shifted 
the focus of USCENTCOM's primary planning event， the Internal Look exercise， from a potential 
Soviet invasion of lran to a new regional threat-Saddam Hussein's Iraq. ln fact， there were 
striking simiIarities between the scenario of this command exercise and the actual movement of 
Iraqi forces that resu1ted in the invasion of Kuwait in the 1ast days of the Interna1 Look exercise 
(United States Central Command n.d.b). 
Since the end of Gulf War of 1991， USCENTCOM's activities have been atfected by a series 
of terrorist attacks. USCENTCOM commenced Operation Desert Focus to re10cate American 
installations in Saudi Arabia to safer locations within the country after 19 Americans were killed 
in the bombing of Khobar Towers (where U.S. military personnel were housed) in Saudi Arabia 
in 1996. U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were also attacked by terrorists in 1998， and the 
USS Cole was attacked in October 2000， killing 12 and 1 7 Americans，問spectively.Moreover， in 
response to 9/1， Operation Enduring Freedom was launched by USCENTCOM to drive out the 
Taliban government in Afghanistan， and Operation Iraqi Freedom to invade Iraq. USCENTCOM 
continues operations in these two countries (United States Central Command 2009). 
With regard to U.S. access to Afghanistan， Central Asian countries， which fal within 
USCENTCOM's AOR， play a pivotal role. Supply lines， in the form of the Northern Distribution 
Network， have been established in this region to transport supp1ies to support U.S.， NATO， 
and Afghan security operations (United States Central Command 2009). There were thorny 
negotiations between some of the Central Asian countries and the United States with regard to 
access agreements. Uzbekistan， which allowed the United States to use an airport shortly after 
9/11， asked the U.S. to leave in July 2005 (Wright and Tyson 2005). Ky 
4. The United States European Command 
The U.S. European Command was established on August 1， 1952. During the Cold War， this 
command was the 1eading command to dea1 with the Soviet threat. Today， EUCOM's area of 
responsibility includes Europe， Russia， Iceland， Greenland， and Israel. The headquarters are 
located in Stuttgart， Germany (United States European Command n.d.). 
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As WWII ended， rapid demobilization accompanied by the end of the occupation of Germany 
in 1949 raised questions regarding the commitment to the defense of Western Europe. The North 
Korean attack of South Korea in June 1950 shocked the United States and its alies. Fearing that 
the Soviet Union might engage in a similar attack， U.S. military personnel in Europe grew between 
1950 and 1953 from 120，000 to more than 400，000. ln the 1970s， there was again growing 
concern 1n Europe as the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968. However， the troop 
levels did not increase. as the United States was tied down in the Vietnam War. The U.S. also 
had balance of payment problems. Consequently， the troop level decreased to 265，000 by 1970 
(United States European Command n.d.) 
With the end of the Cold War and the decline of the Soviet threat， the troop level in the 
region fel dramatically. However， the United States maintained a stable presence with 100，000 
troops， or roughly the same number as in Asia. Although the relative importance of bases located 
in Europe has declined， the value of bases located in countries such as Germany continues to be 
felt. Established democracies do not ask the United States for exorbitant rent. This is also the case 
with countries like the United Kingdom and Italy (United States European Command n.d.) 
5. The United States Southern ζommand 
The AIモaof Focus of the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) includes 31 countries and 10 
territories， and this region represents“about one欄sixthof the landmass of the world assigned to 
regional uni五edcommands (United States Southern Command 2009)." More specifically， countries 
and territories in this area include: Antigua and Barbuda， Argentina， Barbados， Belize， Bolivia， 
Brazil， the Cayman Islands， Chile， Colombia， Costa Rica， Dominica， the Dominican Republic， 
Ecuador， El Salvador， Grenada， Guatemala， Guyana， Haiti， Honduras， Jamaica， Nicaragua， Panama， 
Paraguay， Peru， St.Kitts and Nevis， St.Lucia， St.Vincent and the Grenadines， Suriname， Trinidad 
and Tobago， Uruguay， and Venezuela. 
The origin of USSOUTHCOM goes back in the early 20th century， when the administration 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt established the U.S. Caribbean Defense Command in order to defend 
the Panama Canal and the surrounding area. Located in Panama， SOUTHCOM was engaged in 
regional defense， including antisubmarine warfare and counter-espionage activities. Military 
training was another primary activity. These wartime headquarters were then transformed into 
the U.S. Caribbean Command， with expanded responsibilities including security cooperation in 
Central and South America. However， during the 1950s， the Caribbean Basin was rei10ved from 
the area of focus. The Caribbean Basin would have been essential to hemispheric anti-submarine 
operations in the event of war with the Soviet Union， and the U.S. Atlantic Command， based in 
Norfolk， Virginia， would have conducted the operations. On June 6， 1963， during the Kennedy 
Administration， the name was changed to the U.S. Southern Command to reflect the actual area of 
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focus. In the 1960s， the U.S. Southern Command was in charge of a militar、yassistance program 
for Central and South America. After the Vietnam War. the U.S. Southern Comrnand's roles were 
significantly reduced. However， in the 1980s， as internal conflicts intensified in countries like 
Nicaragua and El Salvador， the Reagan adrninistration renewed U.S. interest in the region and 
revitalized the Southern Command. After the end of the Cold War. the U.S. Southern Cornrnand's 
objective focused on counter-narcotics operations and again inc1uded the Caribbean within its 
area of focus. In 1997， the command was moved to Miarni， Florida frorn Panarna， two years prior 
to the return of the Panarna Canal to Panama in 1999 (Coleman 2009). There are no countries 
covered in this cornrnand structure that seriously atternpt to threaten Arnerica's national security 
today. However， the United States continues to watch the region through SOUTHCOM. 
6. The United States Northern 仁ommand
In response to the attacks of Septernber 11， 2001， USNORτHCOM was created on October 
1， 2002， to protect the United States homeland and to coordinate defense support of civil 
authorities. Such activities inc1ude dornestic relief operations in times of hurマicanes，自res，floods， 
and earthquakes. USNORTHCOM's Area of Responsibility (AOR) inc1udes: "air， land and sea 
approaches and encompasses the continental United States， Alaska， Canada， Mexico and the 
surrounding water out to approxirnately 500 nautical rniles. It also inc1udes the Gulf of Mexico， 
the Straits of Florida， portions of the Caribbean region to inc1ude The Baharnas， Puerto Rico， and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands. The cornmander of USNORTHCOM is responsible for theater security 
cooperation with Canada， Mexico， and The Bahamas (The United States North America Command 
n.d.)." 
It is interesting to note that the Northern Comrnand was one of the last regional comrnands 
to be created. This does not mean that horneland defense was ignored in the past， but it perhaps 
shows how the United States was more concerned about what was happening beyond its own 
borders. The very existence of the global cornrnand structure attests to such thinking. In addition， 
the fact that the United States continues to maintain its global cornrnand structure or create new 
cornrnands partially ilIustrates America's willingness to sustain its predorninant position in the 
world. 
V.仁onclusion
The analysis here shows the dorninance of U.S. rnilitary presence abroad. Although overall 
numbers have dec1ined since the end of the Cold War， the United States rernains the largest 
sender of troops abroad. The nurnber of SOFAs also shows that America expanded its access 
even after the end of the Cold War. Moreover， no other countty has a cornmand structure that 
goes beyond its own borders and one that encirc1es alrnost the entire globe. The predorninance 
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of U.S. power is reflected in the existence of such a command structure， and the newly created 
commands further attest that the United States is not willing to retreat from various regions of 
the world any time soon. As such， this paper suggests that the United States seems to be trying to 
maintain the unipolar international structUl‘e in which it is the only superpower. 
Because this paper provides only a general overview of the U.S. global presence， case 
studies a1'e stil1 needed to look further into the relationships between the United States and host 
countries. Moreover， possible theoretical resea1'ch could include examining whether 01' not great 
powers like the United States are off-shore balancers (Layne刊 1997， Mea剖1's叶he剖ime1'2001， Wa1t 
2006). An off-shore balancer is a great power that 1'etreats 台、oma particular region when threats 
dεcline， but comes back to counter a potential 1'egional hegemon only when such a state arises. 
Whether the United States is in fact an of手shorebalancer， or a nation pursuing global hegemony， 
will be an important question as U.S. presence or non-presence can greatly influence the 
calculation of regional players， which in turn a百'ectthe security environment around the world. 
*The research on which this pape1' is based was supported by JSPS Granιin-Aid 1'or Young 
Scientists (B) KAKENHI (10375389). 
木村ドAssistantPro1'essor， University ofTsukuba 
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